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Unveiling informal business networks
As people criss-cross the business world, they 
weave relationships across negotiation tables, 
through airport lounges and into boardrooms. 
Auditors of ﬁnancial statements circulate widely 
in this world, yet when it comes to their clients, 
they must remain above the fray. The closer they 
are to the clients they check, the more trust drains 
from the opinions they write. 
To ensure auditors and their clients keep a 
safe distance between each other, regulators 
have issued phone book-sized regulations 
and standards. But to know everything about 
auditor-client networks is impossible, and even 
when we do see connections, it is difficult to 
ascertain if the relationship facilitates or 
endangers the audit.
In accountancy, eventually the numbers 
resolve all mysteries. Connecting the dots across 
business databases is how School of Accountancy 
Professor Zang Yoonseok sheds new light on 
previously unexamined business ties.
LINKING INFORMAL RELATIONSHIPS AND 
BAD ACCOUNTING
Like investors and regulators around the 
world, Professor Zang was curious about why, 
despite their universally acknowledged 
importance and tight regulations, auditors 
sometimes spectacularly fail to raise the red 
flag on bad accounting.
Previous research and the standards followed 
by auditors focused on formal relationships that 
create obvious conﬂicts of interest for auditors, 
and the most apparent of these includes ﬁnancial 
relationships – or prospects of landing a plum 
job at the client after the audit.
But the research appeared to overlook 
informal business and social networks between 
auditors and their clients, which could be just 
as important, explains Professor Zang, who 
joined up with colleagues in Korea and Holland 
to study the impact of these relationships on 
audit quality.
“We observed that many companies in the 
US liked to appoint board CEOs and CFOs from 
other companies in the industry, and we thought 
it would be possible to study how these networks 
affected the audit,” he notes.
The researchers used a database called 
Audit Analytics to identify firms that had 
switched auditors, and BoardEx, to identify 
CEOs or CFOs who knew the auditors from 
their membership on other boards. This work 
harvested a sample of 597 ﬁrms that switched 
auditors to Big 4 auditors over the period of 
2003-2012.
Their results, published in a paper titled 
‘The Downside of Network Ties between 
CEO/CFOs and Auditors through External 
Directorships’, revealed that when CEOs or 
CFOs have business ties with a new auditor 
through their directorship of another company, 
their companies were more likely to appoint 
connected auditors.
Perhaps more significantly, companies 
that appointed connected auditors also 
experienced poorer quality audits, compared 
to companies that appointed non-connected 
auditors. This means that they experienced 
more misstatements, an increased propensity 
to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks, 
and an increased magnitude of accounting 
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decisions made by management choices rather 
than business reasons – which is known in the 
industry as discretionary accruals.
Professor Zang suggests that two factors 
could be causing the drop in audit quality. One is 
familiarity, which could slowly eat away the 
auditor’s professional scepticism. The second is 
compromised independence, due to the CEO’s 
or CFO’s ‘bargaining power’ over an auditor 
who also audits a company where the CEO or 
CFO is a director. “Some CEOs and CFOs are 
very powerful – they exercise big inﬂuences in 
board decisions. That is why it is always better to 
keep a good distance between auditors and 
executives,” he stresses.
CONSERVATIVE ACCOUNTING –  
LESS ACCURATE BUT BETTER?
In another example of bringing real world 
insight into areas previously only examined 
through theory, Professor Zang’s empirical 
research has also uncovered the impact on 
audit quality of another controversial change in 
the accounting world – the move away from 
conservative accounting.
Under a conservative accounting approach, 
companies are slower to recognise profits 
and faster to acknowledge losses in the 
reported accounts. In recent years, standard 
setters have steered away from this seemingly 
prudent approach in favour of real-time 
accuracy – for example reporting the fair market 
value is favoured over reporting historical- 
based assessments.
In theory, auditors prefer conservative 
accounting so that companies will not hold on to 
bad news until the last possible moment.
Putting this theory to the test, Professor Zang 
and his colleagues used audit-related information 
from the Audit Analytics database for the period 
of 2000-2010, and merged it with other data to 
obtain ﬁnancial and stock return variables.
Their ﬁndings, in the article published in 
The Accounting Review ‘Client Conservatism and 
Auditor-Client Contracting’ with M. L. DeFond 
and C.Y. Lim, pointed to beneﬁts not previously 
appreciated with conservative accounting. They 
found that auditors of more conservative 
clients charged lower fees, issued fewer ongoing 
concern opinions, and resigned less frequently.
More opportunities to investigate factors 
affecting audit quality could come with further 
changes to ﬁnancial reporting and auditing rules, 
says Professor Zang. These include proposals in 
the US to disclose the name of the individual audit 
partners in charge of the audit, rather than just 
the name of the audit ﬁrm.
“With more information about an individual’s 
background, social interactions, and educational 
background, we could do more interesting 
research about the impact of networks on audit 
quality,” he says.
The effect of informal business networks on 
audit quality might be particularly important to 
markets with limited pools of directors, like 
Singapore, says Professor Zang. “Companies like 
to ﬁnd directors with experience in the industry, 
and this creates many connections across many 
companies. If we do not pay close attention, 
independence could be endangered.” 
